INTRODUCTION
Since multilateral trade negotiatiOns produced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATTY in Geneva in 1947, the world has made dramatic progress toward fr ee trade in goods. Several subsequent rounds of negotiations under the GATT have steadily liberalized international trade, and numerous regional initiatives seek to deepen economic integration among countries prepared to go fu rther. Standard economic theory prescribes fr ee trade as the regime that max1m1zes global econom1c welfare.
Economists also 37 1 recommend trade liberalization as a policy that is likely to produce gains fo r each country.
The gains from trade arise fr om the fa ct that different countries will produce various goods at different costs. When countries restrict trade, the price of a good will be low in countries that can produce the good at low cost, but its price will be high in countries that can produce the good only at higher cost. Liberalized trade allows both countries to gain: the high-price country can import the good at a price less than it what it would cost to produce the good at home; the low price country can export the good and receive a higher price than it would otherwise fe tch.
Precisely the same theory applied to trade in goods also applies to trade in services.
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations recognized this fact in 1994, extending the international regulation of trade to service markets through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)." Free trade in all services, including labor services, would imply fr ee movement of people across borders. To provide many services, workers must cross borders to where the work must be performed, either on a temporary basis or to accept permanent employment. Thus, the fr ee movement of workers across borders promotes economic welfare by promoting fr ee trade in the labor market. The European Union recognizes the importance of fr ee mobility of labor as an element of a comprehensive free trade regime, enshrining this fr eedom in its constitution as one of the "four freedoms" that are the basic pillars of the European common market, "an area without internal frontiers in which the fr ee movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured. "3 This "freedom of movement fo r workers" in tum entails "the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers ... with respect to employment."4 Immigration barriers interfere with the fr ee flow of labor internationally and thereby cause wage rates fo r the same class of labor to diverge widely among different countries. For any given class of labor, residents of high-wage countries could gain by employing more immigrant labor, and residents of low-wage countries could gain by selling more of their labor to employers in high-vvage countries. Economic efficiency in the global labor market would call fo r unrestricted migration, which would allow labor to move fr eely to the country where it earns the highest return. Market fo rces would thus direct labor to the market where its marginal product is highest. Given the large international differences in wages, it should be apparent that the potential gains from international trade in labor (and the costs we bear as a result of immigration barriers) are large.
Indeed, studies suggest that the gains to the world economy fr om removing immigration barriers could well be enormous and greatly exceed the gains fr om removing trade barriers. For example, Bob Hamilton and John Whalley provide estimates that suggest that the gains from free migration of labor would more than double worldwide real income, indicating that immigration controls "are one of the (and perhaps the) most important policy issues fa cing the global economy."5 Even their most conservative estimate suggests that the gains would be a significant fr action (over thirteen percent) of worldwide real income.6 Furthermore, their analysis indicates that the free migration of labor would also greatly improve the global distribution of income by raising real wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers. 7 Recognizing the importance of immigration barriers as costly trade barriers, developing countries, especially India, have pressed for liberalized movement of labor as part of the liberalization of world trade in services. India, with the support of the Philippines, Egypt, Brazil, and Pakistan, has threatened to block progress on the liberalization of trade in financial services in the absence of progress on the "movement of natural persons," which is the subj ect of a parallel set of negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WT0).8 In spite of the large efficiency gains that liberalized immigration policies would produce, however, the authors of the GATS were careful to avoid imposing any obligations with respect to immigration policies. 9 Indeed, in 1995 the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, headed by Barbara Jordan, urged Congress to move radically in the opposite direction, toward more restrictive immigration laws. 10 The Jordan Commission recommended sweeping changes in longstanding U.S. immigration laws, including a reduction in the overall level of legal immigration into the United States by one-third.'' The proposed changes included permanent cuts in both employment-based and family-based immigration. 12 These proposals would entail the most restrictive changes in U.S. immigration law since immigration quotas were first introduced in 1921.'3 President Bill Clinton immediately 12 The Jordan Commission proposed permanent reductions in the numerical limits fo r employment-based admissions (from 140,000 to I 00,000 per year) and fo r fa mily-based admissions (from 480,000 to 400,000 per year). See JORDAN COMM'N. supra note I 0, at xii. The Commission also proposed the complete elimination of all fam ily-based immigration categories other than nuclear fa mily admissions. See id at xviii. endorsed these proposals. 14 Senator Alan Simpson and Representative Lamar Smith, both Republicans, soon introduced bills to implement the Jordan Commission's recommendations. 15 These radical cuts in legal immigration proved controversial, however, and after heated debate, both the House of Representatives and the Senate ultimately voted to exclude these cuts fr om their immigration reform bills.
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Nevertheless, the Commission reiterated its restrictionist recommendations in its 1997 report to Congress, 17 and observers expect restrictionists in Congress to revive their effo rts to implement these proposals in the near future.
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The Commission asserted that its proposals would serve "the national interest," citing a recent report that it had commissioned fr om the National Research Council, 19 which presents the most thorough analysis of the economic effects of immigration conducted so far. Yet as Commissioner Warren Leiden observed in his statement dissenting fr om the Jordan Commission's proposal to reduce legal immigration, the Commission "can provide no convincing argument fo r this drastic reduction" because "there is no obj ective basis fo r a drastic reduction."20 In fa ct, as this article will show, the application of trade principles to immigration law, together with the results of the Council's empirical analysis, suggests instead that specific liberalizing reforms, which are likely to increase levels of employment-based and family-based immigration by eliminating certain immigration barriers, would raise national economic welfare as well as global economic welfare.
Given the importance of economic concerns in the public debate over immigration policy, I will fo cus on the implications of immigration fo r economic welfare. Although the economic theory that I use applies to any country of immigration, I will fo cus on the United States as my central example, taking the empirical evidence regarding immigration into the United States and deriving policy implications fo r the United States in particular. In particular, this article will begin with a fo cus on immigration fo r the purpose of employment, because it is largely justified on economic grounds, although the analysis will have implications fo r immigration in general. I will use the term "immigration" in a broad sense, including not only the admission of aliens fo r permanent residence (on "immigrant" visas) but also the admission of guest-workers on a more temporary basis (on what are called "nonimmigrant" visas in the United States).21 Thus, I will fo cus on the issue of admission to the labor market of the host country, which does not necessarily imply access to citizenship in the host country.
Before reaching any conclusions regarding the optimal level of immigration, one must specify the criterion by which one will evaluate the effects of immigration. To shed light on our immigration laws, I will explore what policies would be optimal fr om the perspective of economic welfare. In evaluating the effects of immigration policies upon economic welfare, however, we must first address the question of whose welfare we are considering. Should we seek to maximize the welfare of natives (those born in the country of immigration) alone? Should we seek to maximize national economic welfare or global economic welfare? Once we decide whose welfare counts, we must also address whether our objective is merely to maximize their wealth (that is, to pursue economic efficiency with respect to their welfare) or our objectives also include an equitable distribution of wealth among them.
If our objectives include distributive concerns, then our 21 U.S. law creates numerous categories of "nonimmigrant"' aliens admitted to the United States on a temporary basis. 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(a)( l5) (1994). These categories include not only students. see id § II 0 I (a)( 15)(F), and temporary visitors fo r business or pleasure, see id § IIOI(a)( l5)(8). fo r example, but also temporary workers. see id § I IOI(a)( I5)(H).
measure of social welfare must specify how much weight to give these concerns. Thus, the optimal policy will depend upon what measure of social welfare we choose to maximize. I will not in this article set fo rth a philosophical defense of any particular welfare objective. Instead, my strategy will be to examine what policies the United States would pursue if its goal were simply to maximize the economic welfare of U.S. natives, not because I believe that immigration policy should be guided solely by considerations of economic self-interest, but because such concerns have in fact played a dominant role in the public debate over immigration policy. National governments, including the U.S. government, will probably continue to deem the promotion of the interests of natives as the paramount objective of immigration policies. I derive the optimal policy given that objective as a theoretical exercise, not because this welfare objective is morally defensible, but because this obj ective is commonly thought to provide a strong case in favor of restrictive immigration laws.
This thought experiment reveals, however, that even fr om this narrow perspective, which "stacks the deck" against the immigrant, optimal policies would probably allow higher levels of employment based and family-based immigration than current U.S. immigration laws permit. Even if we give zero we ight to the welfare of aliens in our measure of social welfare, the optimal immigration policy would be more liberal than our current laws in most important respects. In particular, although the economic welfare of natives and distributive justice among natives are often advanced as reasons to reduce immigration, I will demonstrate that neither objective provides a sound justification fo r more restrictive laws regarding employment based and family-based immigration.
In Part II, I examine immigration policies that efficiently promote the welfare of natives, setting aside questions of distribution. I conclude that optimal policies would probably entail higher levels of employment-based and fa mily-based immigration than we currently allow into the United States. For example, the U.S. should eliminate both the quantitative restrictions and the "labor certification" requirements currently imposed on employment-based immigration.
Optimal immigration policy would instead take the fo rm of a "tariff, " that is, a tax imposed on immigrants. This tariff could take the fo rm of an income tax that discriminates between citizens and aliens. Although some economists have previously suggested a tax on fo reign workers/2 my comprehensive analysis builds on that suggestion by exploring the fe atures of the optimal immigration tariff in detail. I find that the optimal tariff is positive fo r immigrants with low incomes but is likely to be negative fo r immigrants with sufficiently high incomes.
These results suggest that skilled immigration should be permitted (indeed encouraged) without quantitative or other protectionist restrictions and that unskilled immigration should be permitted without quantitative restrictions but subject to less generous fiscal policies than those applied to natives.
In Part III, I introduce distributive justice among natives as an objective . Concern fo r the distribution of income among natives, however, does not imply that more restrictive immigration laws are in order. Instead, the appropriate response to distributive concerns is redistribution through progressive reforms of tax and transfer policies, not immigration restnctwns. Finally, in Part IV, I explore the normative implications of my economic analysis and fo rmulate proposals fo r liberalizing U.S. immigration laws in light of some of the political realities that inhibit such reforms.
II. NATIONAL ECONOMIC WELFARE
I begin my analysis of the optimal immigration policy from the standpoint of national economic welfare defined narrowly, in terms of the wealth of natives alone. First, I will consider the effects of immigration upon natives through labor markets, setting aside economic effects that operate outside the market. Second, I will extend the analysis to include the effects of immigration upon natives through the public sector.
A.
Ef fects of Immigration Through the Labor Market
For a country with no market power in international markets, such that it cannot affect world prices, standard trade theory prescribes free trade to maximize national economic welfare. Import quotas or tariffs restrict trade and thereby sacrifice gains from trade. Protectionism imposes costs by driving up the price paid by domestic consumers fo r the goods in question. As a result consumption fal ls, leading to deadweight loss insofar as consumers fo rego consumption even if the value they would derive from it exceeds the amount paid to fo reigners fo r the imported good. Domestic production also rises, leading to deadweight loss insofar as productive resources are drawn from alternative uses more valuable than the amount paid to fo reigners fo r the imported good. Domestic producers may gain from higher prices fo r their goods, but this gain comes only at the expense of consumers, who must pay these higher prices. The gain to domestic producers is a pure transfer fr om consumers. Indeed, because protectionism causes distortions in domestic production and consumption, consumers lose more than domestic producers gain. The national economy as a whole suffe rs a net loss as a result of protectionism.
The same theory indicates that free immigration would maximize the gains from trade in the labor market fo r a country with no market power in fo reign labor markets. Immigration restrictions impose costs by driving up the cost of labor, which in tum drives up the cost of goods and services to consumers. Native workers may gain from higher wages, but this gain comes only at the expense of employers in the host country and ultimately consumers. The increase in wages fo r domestic labor is a pure transfer from owners of other fa ctors of production (for example, capital and land) in the host country and from consumers. Immigration restrictions not only redistribute wealth among natives but also destroy wealth by causing economic distortions.
Restrictions prevent employers from hiring fo reign workers even if the value that they would produce exceeds the wage that would be paid to the worker. Immigration restrictions entail a sacrifice of this "immigration surplus. "23 Thus, the U.S. private sector would benefit from the elimination of all restrictions on the immigration of labor. If a country nevertheless chooses to protect a domestic market, standard trade theory recommends tariffs over quotas. Both tariffs and quotas sacrifice gains fr om trade, but tariffs produce some revenue for the government, which quotas do not. Quotas make the right to import scarce and therefore valuable. This value derives from prices in the importing country that are higher than those available on the world market. The scarcity of quota rights create "quota rents," which an importing country could capture by selling the right to import. In practice, countries do not sell these rights, allowing importers to enj oy these quota rents. A tariff that restricts trade to a level equivalent to a quota will capture these quota rents in the form of tariff revenue.
Similarly, if a country restricts immigration of labor, the optimal restriction would take the fo rm of a tariff, not quotas. Quotas allow immigrants to keep the quota rents in the fo rm of after-tax wages higher than those that prevail in alternative labor markets. A tariff could take the form of a charge fo r admission, which would be similar to quantitative restrictions with an auction to allocate the available visas to those potential immigrants. By selling visas, the country of immigration can capture the quota rents that would otherwise go to the immigrant.
A tariff, however, could also take the form of a discriminatory income tax, rather than a payment up front, which would have the advantage that the immigrant would not need to have The National Research Council surveys similar estimates, '·on the order of $1 to $10 billion a year . . . which "may be modest re lative to the size of the U.S. economy, but ... remains a signi ficant positive gain in absolute terms ·· NRC, supra note 19. at 153. Higher levels of immigration would bring a more than proportionate increase in the immigration surplus because the marginal benefits of immigration increase with the quantity of immigration: more of the decline in domestic wages comes at the expense of immigrant workers rather than natives. Therefore, we would expect a more liberal policy to produce much larger total economic benefits fo r natives. the resources to pay the tariff at the border. 24 The immigrant could pay the tariff as extra income taxes withheld fr om income earned after immigration. 25 For a country with some market power, protectionist trade policies will have an effect on prices on the world market. In this case, standard trade theory predicts that the country can improve on free trade by imposing the "optimal tariff. "26 The optimal tariff would still entail costly distortions, but it would also bring a gain to the importing country by driving down the price received by fo reigners fo r the imported goods. The importing country can thus extract more of the gains from trade through tariff revenues.
The same principles apply to imported labor. To the extent the U.S. can affect wages abroad, it has market power in the market fo r fo reign labor, and it can gain by imposing a "tariff' on immigrant labor (that is, a discriminatory tax imposed only upon fo reign workers). Under these conditions, the burden of a tariff would fa ll not only on employers and consumers but also on immigrant labor, because the tariff would drive the after-tax wages of migrants below 24 See Chiswick. supra note 22. at 309 (proposing that the U.S. allow immigrants ""to substitute an annual surcharge on their federal income tax as an alternative to [a] large entry fe e"'): Julian L. Simon. Auction the Right to Be an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1986. at A25 (suggesting that the United States ""allow 'buyers' to enter now and pay later together with income tax"").
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Some commentators have suggested that effo rts to impose discriminatory taxes on immigrants could encounter constitutional objections. See, e.g., Bhagwati & Srinivasan. supra note 22. at 211 ("[T]he (discriminatory) taxation by the country of residence of fo reign labour is fr aught with numerous difficulties fr om legal, constitutional, human-rights and political standpoints."); Chiswick, supra note 22, at 309 n.34 (predicting that an ""annual income tax surcharge"" would raise the objection ""that it is unconstitutional"). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has applied a lenient standard of review to federal laws that discriminate against aliens. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.12. at 704 (4th ed. 1991) (noting that "it would appear that the fe deral government may use a citizenship classification so long as it is arguably related to a federal interest"" and that ""alienage classifications created by fe deral law will be subjected to only the rational basis standard of review""). In Ala thews v. Dia::, 426 U.S. 67 (I 976), the Court held that Congress could provide fe deral medical insurance to citizens while restricting the access of aliens to this program. This defe rential standard of review fo r federal laws discriminating against aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits suggests that the Court would uphold similar restrictions on alien access to tax benefits, such as the earned income tax credit. See infr a note 39. what they would be in a world of fr ee trade in labor. To maximize na tional economic welfare, a country with some market power in the rel evant market would raise taxes on migrants so as to shift income fr om immigrant workers to the public treasury. For a sufficiently small tariff, the gains from raising tax revenues at the expense of migrant workers would exceed the costs of deterring valuable immigration. The government would capture these gains fo r the benefit of natives in the fo rm of tariff revenue. The optimal tariff would vary depending on the type of labor, because different classes of labor would entail diffe rent market conditions. Thus, a discriminatory income tax would have an advantage over a uniform charge fo r admission, insofar as it could impose a tariff that is a fu nction of income.
B. External Effects of Immigration
The fo regoing analysis considered the economrc effects of immigrant labor through the labor market alone.
Immigrants, however, also have economic effects that are not internalized by private participants in that market.
An immigration tariff, fo r example, yields benefits fo r the public sector, not fo r the private sector. Indeed, much of the debate over the economic effects of immigration has fo cused on the effects on the public sector.27 The presence of the public sector introduces external effects that must be included in the analysis.
These effects include both benefits and costs, so that depending on the immigrant, it is possible fo r the net external effe ct to be positive or negative. First, like natives, immigrants pay taxes, including income taxes, social security taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes. All these taxes introduce an additional reason to value immigrants: they increase tax revenues by expanding the tax base. Second, an immigrant also imposes external costs. For example, to the extent that an immigrant receives transfer payments from the government or has access to other public entitlement programs, these transfers will represent a cost to the country of immigration. Immigrants also gain access to public goods when they immigrate. To the extent they are pure public goods, like national defense, immigrants can enjoy the public good without imposing any cost on natives. Immigrant access to other public goods, however, may aggravate problems of congestion. Roads, fo r example, may become congested more fr equently or more severely.
Some immigrants may impose external costs in excess of the taxes they pay. Those immigrants who pay the least in such taxes would be the most likely to impose net external costs on natives. Thus, the net effect of an immigrant on the public sector may be positive or negative, so that the marginal benefit to a private employer of hiring a fo reign worker may understate or overstate the marginal benefit to the "importing" country fr om the immigration of that worker.
Thus, because skilled workers tend to have higher incomes and to pay more in taxes, it is especially in the national economic interest to promote their immigration. The National Research Council, fo r example, fo und that the average immigrant with more than a high school education pays enough in taxes to produce a net fiscal benefit.28 As long as they make a positive contribution to the public sector, there is in general no economic justification fo r excluding these immigrants. Quantitative or other protectionist restrictions on their immigration should be eliminated.
To the extent that unskilled workers tend to have lower incomes, they tend to pay less in taxes and to take greater advantage of public entitlement programs, so that the benefits flowing to the national economy fr om their immigration may be reduced and may be negative. The Council fo und that the average immigrant with less than a high-school education imposes a net fiscal cost. 29 A net negative effect through the public sector introduces a possible justification fo r restricting their immigration. The international trade perspective, however, suggests that if some immigrants have a negative effect on the public sector, the optimal response is not non-tariff restrictions on immigration, such as quotas. Rather, the appropriate response is fiscal. In such cases, we can use a tariff, that is, a tax imposed only on cs See id at 334 (Table 7 .5).
c9 See id.
immigrants, to restrict access to all our public goods and public entitlements.
C.
The Optimal Tariffon Unskilled Immigrants
Suppose unskilled immigrants would have a negative effect on the public sector in the absence of a tariff, and consider the optimal tariff fo r natives to levy on them. A tariff would increase the contribution of these immigrants to the public coffers as well as discourage their immigration. We could, fo r example, impose a tariff high enough to ensure the marginal immigrant's net effect on the public sector is zero. This "Pigouvian" tariff can reduce immigration to a level that equates the marginal benefits to natives with the marginal costs imposed on natives by immigration, including congestion costs. 30 Because the tariff would ensure that the marginal immigrant would impose no net external cost, this tariff would eliminate any immigration expected to have a negative effect on national economic welfare. The resulting Pigouvian level of immigration would be first-best from the perspective of maximizing the welfare of natives.
Although this level of immigration would be efficient in this sense, it will nevertheless be in the interest of natives to raise the tariff still higher. A tariff above Pigouvian levels will reduce immigration below optimal levels, but will in general produce gains suffi cient to justify this distortion. Governments need revenues to finance the provision of public goods, but most taxes they use to raise revenues will cause costly distortions in the economy. These distortions imply an "excess burden" of taxation: taxes impose costs on the private sector that exceed the revenue collected by the government.31 An optimal tax system will seek to minimize the excess burden associated with raising any given amount of tax revenue . Because tariff revenue raised from immigrants would allow distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy to be reduced, optimal-tax considerations would call fo r a tariff even if it causes some distortion in the level of immigration. An optimal tariff would be higher than that which induces the optimal quantity of immigration.
Thus, the optimal tariff would assure that each immigrant makes on balance a net positive contribution to the public sector.
Thus, fo r immigrants who would otherwise have a negative economic effect on the public sector, the optimal tariff is unambiguously positive. The larger the (nondiscriminatory) taxes paid by an immigrant, however, the more valuable the immigrant will be fo r public coffe rs, and the less inclined we should be to levy a positive tariff in addition to these other taxes. Indeed, fo r skilled immigrants who would on balance have a sufficiently positive economic effect on the public sector, the optimal tariff could well be zero or even negative.
D.
The Optimal Tariff on Skilled Immigrants
Consider skilled immigrants who have a net positive effect on the public sector even in the absence of a tariff To analyze how the external net benefits associated with these immigrants affect the calculation of the optimal tariff, suppose first that the country of immigration has no market power: the supply of immigrants is perfectly elastic. In this case, there is no "market power" basis fo r a positive optimal tariff, because the incidence of taxes fa lls only upon employers, who must pay higher wages as a result of taxes, not upon the immigrants.
Given these assumptions, it is likely to be in the national economic interest to discriminate in fa vor of skilled immigrants in our income tax rates.
The fa ct that these immigrants make net positive contributions to the public sector implies that their tax payments are above Pigouvian levels and thus high enough to distort their immigration below fi rst-best levels and produce deadweight loss. Lower taxes would expand immigration toward the first-best level, which would bring a gain fo r the economy as a whole.
A complete analysis, however, would also consider the need to raise tax revenues. Taking these effects into account still points toward lower tax rates on immigrant labor if the supply of this labor is perfectly elastic. Optimal-tax theory prescribes lower tax rates on markets where supply or demand is more elastic, so as to minimize the excess burden of taxation.32 Thus, suppose that skilled immigrants pay enough in taxes other than income taxes (such as sales taxes and property taxes) to cover any external costs they impose on natives. Optimal-tax theory would prescribe higher income taxes on natives than on immigrants as long as the supply of their labor is less elastic than the perfectly elastic supply of immigrant labor. Lower taxes on immigrants would increase immigration, which would generate new tax revenues as well as reduce the cost of labor fo r employers. Under these circumstances, the optimal tariff is unambiguously negative.
Suppose instead, however, that the supply of immigrant labor is less than perfectly elastic. If the supply of immigrant labor is upward sloping, then the optimal tariff is no longer unambiguously negative. Inelasticity of immigrant labor supply introduces two considerations that would cut in fa vor of higher tariffs.
First, "market power" considerations militate in fa vor of a positive tariff on immigrants. These considerations would tend to be weak, however, when nondiscriminatory taxes are already high. To the extent we have market power, income and wage taxes not only discourage immigration but also drive the after-tax wages of immigrants downward. Both these effects undercut the case fo r a positive tariff. The more immigrants pay in these other taxes, the greater the marginal costs of a tariff (we lose more tax revenues when immigration falls) and the smaller the marginal benefits (there are fe wer immigrants whose after-tax wages will fall).
Second, the more inelastic the supply of immigrant labor, the less optimal-tax considerations militate in favor of negative tariffs . These considerations would still militate in favor of lower taxes on immigrants than on natives, however, as long as the supply of immigrant labor is more elastic than the supply of domestic labor. We would expect this condition to hold over the relevant range of wages: the supply of domestic labor is elastic largely because native workers have the option of leaving the labor fo rce, whereas immigrants have not only the option of leaving the labor fo rce but also the option of remaining in their native countries and accepting employment there. Natives of a country of immigration are less likely than immigrants to respond to taxes by leaving (or failing to enter) the domestic labor market, because each worker is inclined, ceteris paribus, to remain in the worker's native country. Immigrants by definition have self selected as workers willing to move, given the international diffe rences in wage levels, but the costs of moving, both psychic and financial, imply that many would also decide not to move if taxes reduce the rewards to migration. Thus, the decision of each individual immigrant to supply labor to the country of immigration is likely to be more sensitive to taxes than the decision of natives to supply labor to the domestic labor market.
Furthermore, we would expect the elasticity of the supply of immigrant labor to be particularly large if the supply of immigrant labor is drawn from a world labor market that is large relative to the domestic labor market. Given the size of the world labor market, we would in general expect the supply of immigrant labor to be quite elastic. Thus, optimal-tax considerations not only militate in favor of a negative tariff, but these considerations may also be significant. Furthermore, the elasticity of immigrant labor supply also suggests that "market power" considerations in favor of positive tariffs may be weak.
Thus, the optimal tariff may be positive, but without precise information on elasticities and other data, the optimal tariff may also be negative . It is especially likely to be negative fo r classes of immigrants who already bear a high tax burden, because they are attractive fr om a fiscal perspective. For skilled immigrants expected to pay a large amount in income and other taxes, it is likely to be in the national interest to offe r lower tax rates than those imposed on natives, in order to encourage the immigration of more taxpayers .
E. Immigration ofNu clear Families and Future Effe cts
For simplicity of analysis the fo regoing discussion has treated immigrants as simply individual workers. In reality, workers may often be reluctant to migrate without bringing close family members with them. What would be the optimal immigration policy regarding the admission of an immigrant worker's fa mily? As long as the psychic and economic benefits of family unification (measured by the immigrants' willingness to pay fo r these benefits) exceed the congestion costs the additional immigrants would impose on natives, it will be optimal to allow workers to bring their relatives. These benefits are likely to be sufficiently large fo r a worker's immediate family (spouses and dependent minor children), who derive large benefits fr om cohabitation. Given the large benefits of keeping nuclear fa milies united, the total benefits to the immigrant fam ily would probably exceed any net external costs that these relatives would impose on natives, even after accounting fo r congestion costs.
With appropriate fiscal policies, natives can gain from the admission of these relatives. First, the immigrant household will pay more in sales and other taxes. Second, if these extra taxes are insufficient to create a net positive external effe ct of these additional immigrants, the immigrant family would be willing pay a higher tariff to compensate natives fo r any increase in external costs, such as congestion costs and any net transfers. By charging a higher tariff on larger immigrant families, natives can capture some of the surplus produced by family unification. The optimal tariff on an immigrant household would depend on the economic effects of the household as a whole and thus would be a function of the household's total income and size as well as the number of dependent minor children.
The effect of an additional family member on this optimal tariff raises an empirical question regarding the economic effe ct of that additional immigrant. In calculating this effect, we must take into account the effects that each immigrant will have over the entire life cycle, including the effects that each immigrant's descendants will have. The children and other descendants of the immigrant workers we admit will produce the same type of gains from trade in the labor market that the immigrants themselves will bring. These positive effects upon the private sector offe r no reason to adj ust the optimal tariff upward. The only possible negative effe ct would come through the public sector. Is there any reason to think that immigration will produce negative external costs?
To derive the optimal immigration policy, we would add up all future costs and benefits associated with each immigrant worker, including all the fiscal costs and benefits associated with that immigrant's descendants, discounting each cost and benefit to a net present value. With respect to each class of immigrant, we would estimate the expected total net present value on a per capita basis, which would be an average calculated in the face of uncertainty. We would count this expected value as one component of an immigrant's external effects. The only implication fo r the optimal immigration policy, then, would be an adjustment in the optimal tariff
There is no reason to presume that these effects would call fo r a higher tariff If these future effects produce a positive value for immigration, then a lower tariff would be optimal.
Given the correlation between an immigrant's income and the income of the immigrant's descendants, we might expect skilled immigration to have a positive net effect through fu ture generations.33 Furthermore, one would expect the descendants of even unskilled immigrants to assimilate and to obtain language and other skills that enable them to fa re better than their parents in terms of economic performance. The available empirical evidence suggests that the children of immigrants do tend to outperform their parents on average.34
In fact, the National Research Council has fo und that the descendants of current immigrants into the United States, whether these immigrants are highly educated or not, are likely to have a net positive fiscal effect overall: although the descendants of more educated immigrants tend to have larger positive effects, even the descendants of immigrants with less than a high-school education will on average have a significant positive effect. 35 The Council estimates that once we take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into account, the average immigrant with less than a high school education, fo r example, imposes only a modest net fiscal cost of $13,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.36 The corresponding fiscal impacts of more educated immigrants are positive : the average immigrant with a high-school education produces a net surplus of $5 1 ,000, and the average immigrant with more than a high-school education produces a net surplus of $198,000.37 Furthermore, the Council's analysis also reveals that immigrants who arrive at age 21 or younger, whether highly educated or not, have a positive net fiscal effect.38 This finding suggests that if an immigrant worker brings a dependent child as an immigrant into the United States, this child would represent a reason to reduce taxes on the immigrant worker, even from the perspective of the welfare of natives alone. Indeed, the Council's findings suggest that if an immigrant bears children after immigration, this fact would increase the economic benefits associated with that immigrant household and would represent a reason to adjust taxes on the household downward rather than upward.
F. Restrictions on Public Benefits as a Positive Tariff
A country of immigration may implement a positive tariff on immigration not only through a tax on immigrants but also through restrictions on immigrant access to public entitlement programs. Either fo rm of tariff could improve the effect of immigration on the economic welfare of natives. Natives may gain, fo r example, by denying immigrants access to transfers, such as the earned income tax credit in the United States, which provides cash payments to low income workers.39 A positive tariff on immigrant labor can take the fo rm of an income tax credit provided to all citizens but denied to aliens, combined with an otherwise nondiscriminatory mcome tax system.
The objective of reducing the burden immigrants impose on natives through the public sector underlies restrictions on the access of aliens to various entitlement programs. Under U.S. law, fo r example, even before Congress enacted new restrictions in 1996,40 aliens were generally ineligible fo r most public entitlements, including Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and fo od stamps, unless they had been lawfully admitted fo r permanent residence.41 Thus, not only unauthorized immigrants but also aliens admitted to the United States temporarily as nonimmigrants, including temporary workers, were ineligible fo r most public benefits because they were not lawfully admitted fo r permanent residence.42 Current law now generally excludes nonimmigrants and unauthorized immigrants fr om an even broader range of public benefits: with only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible fo r "any Federal public benefit."43 42 Aliens other than permanent residents, however. may be eligible for the earned income tax credit if they are resident aliens for tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(l)(E) (1994) (excluding nonresident aliens from the earned income ta-.: credit). A lawfu l permanent resident is a resident alien for these purposes, but other aliens may also be resident aliens if they meet certain conditions. See id. § 770 I (b)( I )(A). For example, if an alien's presence in the United States satisfies the "substantial presence'" test set forth in the statute, see id. § 770l (b)(3 ), then the alien is treated as a resident.
43 8 U.S. C. § 1611 (a) (Supp. II 1996). Furthermore, the new law also prohibits states from providing ·'any State or local public benefit" to unauthorized immigrants unless the state subsequently enacts a law that "affirmatively provides for such eligibility '' !d. § 1621 (Supp. II 1996). The new law also makes explicit the exclusion of aliens from the earned income tax Current law also includes extensive new restrictions on the access of other aliens, including even legal permanent residents, to fe deral entitlement programs. In particular, an alien admitted fo r permanent residence after enactment of the new law is ineligible fo r "any Federal means-tested public benefit fo r a period of 5 years beginning on the date of the alien's entry into the United States," with only narrow exceptions.�� Furthermore, these permanent resident aliens are now ineligible fo r fo od stamps and fo r Supplemental Security Income (SSI) without regard to length of residence in the United States, with only narrow exceptions.45 Finally, the new law also permits states to exclude permanent resident aliens, including current recipients already admitted to the United States, from benefits under other fe deral programs, including Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and under state programs, without regard to length of residence in the United States.46 The National Research Council estimates that by excluding immigrants fr om means-tested benefits fo r their first five years in the United States, this welfare legislation improves the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant by $8,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.47 This figure represents an estimate of the average value of the positive tariff imposed by the 1996 welfare legislation.
G. Unemployment
Unemployment poses two types of problems fo r immigration policy. The first arises from the unemployment of immigrants. The second arises fr om the unemployment of natives. First, indigent immigrants who are (or likely to become) unemployed may be unlikely to pay enough taxes to cover the costs of public entitlements that they would receive and the congestions costs that they would generate. For this reason, it may be prudent fo r the United States generally to reserve most employment-based immigration visas fo r those who have offe rs of employment in the United States (and their fa milies). In fact, the immigration laws of the United States currently requires employer sponsorship fo r most categories of employment-based immigration visas . 48 Furthermore, if immigrants who are unlikely to "pay their way" can be identified, and they do not have sponsors (such as relatives in the country of immigration) willing and able to support them, they can be excluded on that ground. The U.S. immigration statute authorizes the exclusion of aliens deemed "likely at any time to become a public charge."49 Second, unemployment among native workers introduces another negative externality from immigration if immigrants increase the involuntary unemployment of natives. The U.S. immigration statute responds to this concern by imposing various restrictions, including quantitative restrictions and "labor certification" requirements, on the admission of employment-based immigrants and temporary workers. The on ly exceptions are aliens with ··extraord inary ability in the sciences. arts. education. business. or athletics.·· id § 1153(b)( 1 )(A) .
.. qualified special immigrants . .. id § 1153(b)(4), and "qualified immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in a new commercial enterprise·· that will employ U.S. workers. id 9 1153(b)(5)(A). The relatively small number of immigrants falling into these categories. including especially skilled or wealthy aliens. may ti le petitions on their own behalf. See id § 1154(a)( I )(C), (E), (F). Aliens seeking visas as temporary workers under U.S. law also require sponsoring employers.
See id § 1 10l(a)( l5)(H).
49 8 US.C. § ll82(a)(4) (Supp. II 1996) ("Any alien who ... at the time of application for admission .. is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.").
so Employment-based immigration is normally capped at 140,000 visas, 8 US.C. § ll51(d) ( 1994 ), but the qualitative restrictions are so stringent and the "labor certification·· requirement so burdensome that this ceiling has not in fact been binding. In the 1996 fiscal year. fo r example, the United States admitted only 117.346 employment-based immigrants. See CIR, supra note 17. at 3. Furthermore, no more than 65,000 temporary workers may enter on H-1 B visas . . to perform services ... in a specialty occupation ... or as a fashion model,"' 8 U.S. C. § II 0 l (a)( l5)(H)(i)(b) ( 1994 ), and no more than 66,000 temporary workers may enter on H-28 visas, id 9 llOI(a)( l5)(H)(ii)(b). See id § l184(g)( l). Congress imposed these numerical limits on temporary workers only recently. in 1990, and these ceilings represent the Labor certification is a determination by the Department of Labor that "there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified, ... and available ... at the place where the alien is to perform" the work in question and that the employment of the alien "will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed."51 The U.S. immigration statute requires labor certification fo r most employment-based immigrants, even aliens "who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability," professionals "who hold baccalaureate degrees," and others "performing skilled labor."52 Through the labor certification requirement, the U . S. government requires U.S. employers to discriminate against fo reign workers: the statute requires an employer to prefer any qualified U.S. worker over any fo reign worker, no matter how much better qualified the fo reign worker may be.53
As long as fi scal policies, employer sponsorship, and the "public charge" provision ensure that these immigrants and temporary workers are expected to have a net positive economic effe ct on natives, however, it would be in the economic interests of U.S. natives to admit them without protectionist "labor certification" requirements or quantitative restnct10ns.
Indeed, immigration need not increase unemployment among natives at all. Immigrants not only expand the local supply of labor but also expand the local demand fo r labor. Immigrant workers will demand goods and services, and many of these goods and services will require locally supplied labor. In fa ct, 
§ 214.2(h)(6)(iv) ( 1998).
53 See LEGOMSKY, supra note 50, at 185 ("[T]he employer ordinari ly must hire a minimally qualified American over a more qualified alien (or hire no one at all)."). The statute requires the U.S. worker to be "equally qualified" only in the case of an alien who "is a member of the teaching profession'' or "has exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts." 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(5)(A) (1994 ) . studies consistently demonstrate that immigration has little effe ct on the employment of natives.54
H.
Citizenship, Guestworkers, and Illegal Immigration
Up to this point, I have analyzed immigration independent of the issue of naturalization as a U.S. citizen.
The possibility of naturalization raises the question of whether discrimination against the immigrant would cease once the immigrant obtains citizenship. If so, then immigrants might anticipate citizenship and subsequent access to public entitlements. If the period of alienage is too short to permit the collection of the Pigouvian tariff, then fiscal policies limited to aliens may fail to deter all immigration with negative economic impact on natives.
We can, however, separate admission to the United States from access to naturalization. Indeed, under U.S. law, only aliens "admitted fo r permanent residence" may naturalize as U.S. citizens.55 Aliens admitted on nonimmigrant visas only, including temporary workers, are not admitted as permanent residents and are thus not eligible fo r most public entitlements and not eligible to naturalize. 56
Classes of fo reign workers deemed likely to have a negative economic impact if treated as citizens can be admitted on nonimmigrant visas without the same entitlement to citizenship implied by immigrant visas. The host country can keep an alien worker in guestworker status fo r as long as it deems necessary to collect the appropriate tariff. The collection of this tariff need not entail permanent status as an alien: the host country could allow the alien to naturalize after a sufficient probationary period has passed.57 The appropriate tariff would at least cover the present discounted value of any net costs that we expect the worker to impose on natives after the worker obtains U.S. citizenship.
The alternative to a guestworker program, fo r many migrant workers and fo r the United States, is probably entry as an unauthorized immigrant. A liberalized guestworker program would relieve the pressures in the labor market that generate unauthorized immigration. In fact, the United States brought in hundreds of thousands of agricultural guestworkers fr om Mexico annually fo r most years of the "bracero" program from 1942 to 1964, and the decline in admissions of such workers was closely correlated with the rise in the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants.58
Legalization of this migration would serve the interests of all parties concerned. The workers would gain fr om having a legal alternative to illegal entry and life as an unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them vulnerable to deportation by the government and to abuse by employers. Illegal immigration implies that the unauthorized immigrant must bear the costs of evading detection, apprehension, and deportation by the government. As a result, producers of counterfeit documents, smugglers, and unscrupulous employers can extract significant quota rents from the immigrant. Through a positive tariff, the government can collect some share of the value that immigrants would enj oy as a result of legal status, including quota rents they would otherwise transfer to fo rgers, smugglers, and unscrupulous employers. Natives would derive more benefit with these rents going 57 Nor would a guestworker program produce a hereditary class of alien residents in the United States. because the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution confers U.S. citizenship on anyone born in the United States, including the children of non immigrants. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.''); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649. 676 ( 1898). Thus, guestworker programs in the United States cannot create the type of caste society that they might in countries that do not provide birthright citizenship. to the public treasury instead, which would allow a reduction in other taxes.
More skilled immigrants, however, will make positive contributions to the public sector even when treated as citizens. There would be little reason fr om an economic perspective to deny these immigrants access to citizenship or to delay their naturalization fo r a significant period of time. On the contrary, because their presence yields external benefits, it is in the interest of the country of immigration to promote their immigration and to strengthen their ties to the host country. Legal status that includes the option of U.S. citizenship in relatively short order would make our offe r more attractive to prospective skilled immigrants and increase the likelihood that they will stay once they take up residence here. Thus, at least in the case of skilled immigrants, we can offe r quick access to U.S. citizenship and simultaneously further the economic interest of natives.
In fa ct, the categories of employment-based immigration visas under U.S. law are largely designed to select particularly skilled or wealthy immigrants for permanent residence. 59 Quotas fo r employment-based immigration allocate most visas to "priority workers," which include aliens with "extraordinary ability," "outstanding professors and researchers," and "multinational executives and managers," to "members of the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability," and to other "skilled workers" and "professionals."60 The vast majority of employment-based immigrants enter through these categories.61 Few unskilled workers can obtain such visas: of the 140,000 visas allocated to employment-based immigration per year, only 10,000 may go to unskilled workers. 62 More employment-based visas are available fo r unskilled workers who enter as nonimmigrants. Unskilled workers may enter on H-2A visas as agricultural workers, which are not subject to a quantitative restriction, or on H-2B visas fo r workers who come "temporarily to the United States to perform ... temporary service or labor," which are limited to 66,000 per year.63 This "double requirement of 'temporariness"' requires the H-2B alien not only to enter temporarily but also to fill a temporary job.64 Furthermore, both visas are subject to labor certification requirements.65 As a result of these requirements, the demand fo r each of these visas have remained low, but the liberalization or elimination of these requirements could greatly increase use of these programs. 66 Employment-based immigration of unskilled workers into the United States has largely taken the fo rm of illegal rather than legal immigration, with this unauthorized immigrant population currently growing by as many as 300,000 aliens each year.67 Given that unauthorized immigrants have little access to public entitlements fo r as long as their presence remains unauthorized, they may make a positive contribution to public coffe rs under the fiscal policies currently applied to them. Without distinguishing between legal and illegal immigrants, the National Research Council fo und that once we take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into account, an immigrant with less than a high-school education imposes years, and admissions under H-2A visas have been similar. ALEINIKOFF ET AL.. supra note 64, at 393, 395; see id. at 395 ("'t is clear, however, that the demand would be much higher but fo r the double 'temporariness' requirement.''); Sykes, supra note 22, at 189 (reporting that '·[a)dmissions under the H-2 categories have been modest in recent years, on the order of 35,000 fo r the two combined" and explaining that '·because of the transaction costs of obtaining a visa coupled with the limited certifications fo r labor shortages in the agricultural sector. employers often find that these visas are not worth the effo rt to procure'').
67 See NRC, supra note 19, at 51.
a net fiscal cost of only $13,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars,68 and that if the 1996 welfare legislation excludes immigrants from seven specified means-tested benefits fo r only their first five years in the United States, then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant would improve by $8,000.69 The Council's figures suggest that if an immigrant never has access to such benefits, as would be the case fo r an unauthorized immigrant who never obtains legal status, then such an immigrant would probably have a positive fiscal impact even if the immigrant is unskilled. These figures also suggest that at current levels of immigration, the tariff that would be sufficient to internalize the net fiscal costs of an unskilled guestworker would be well below the prohibitive level.70 The degree of international inequality in wages, the magnitude of unauthorized immigration into the United States, and the fe es that unauthorized immigrants are willing to pay to smugglers suggest that a large number of aliens would be willing to enter as guestworkers even if this required paying a significant fr action of their income as a 63 See id at 334 (Table 7 .5). 69 See id at 339 (assuming that these programs include ·'SSI, AFDC, fo od stamps, non emergency Medicaid. energy assistance, rent subsidies. and public housing"').
70 If the Council's fi gures represent the fiscal impact of the average unskilled guestworker, such a tariff may come to only several thousand dollars. which even a minimum-wage worker could plausibly pay within a period of several years. A tru ly temporary worker, however, would remain in the United States only while employed and would then return home, imposing even less of a burden on the public treasury than a permanent resident. See Sykes. supra note 22. at 189 (""Temporary workers arc even less likely than permanent immigrants to be a net drain on the public sector, given that these workers pay taxes just like anyone else, fe deral fu nds cannot be used to provide them with pub! ic safety net benefits, and their right to re main in the country general ly depends on continuing employment.'') (footnote omitted).
Immigrants are likely to make a positive contribution to the public treasury during their working years and impose a burden only if they remain in the United States fo r their retirement years and gain access to public benefits. See NRC, supra note I 9, at 315 ( Figure  7.9) . Thus, to avoid a negative fiscal impact, we would only need to collect a tariff from a guestworker who remained in the United States as a permanent resident. For example, v;e could collect a tariff fr om all guestworkers and offe r a rebate fo r any guestworker who chooses to return home, retaining only the tariff revenue necessary to cover the cost of any public benefits provided to the guestworker. For guestworkers who wish to remain in the United States permanently, we could offe r the option of adjusting their status to permanent residence once they had paid a sufficient tariff. The Council's estimates suggest that a modest tariff may be sufficient to cover the expected net fiscal costs of the permanent residence of an average unskilled immigrant.
tariff71 More unskilled workers would probably enter under a liberalized guestworker policy without quotas than under our current laws, even if we were to impose the optimal tari ff on these guestworkers and continue to exclude them from most public benefits.
Under current employment-based immigration policies, the United States reserves permanent residence, and thus citizenship, for the skilled and the wealthy. Those admitted as immigrants to the United States are eligible to apply for citizenship after a five-year waiting period. 72 Given that the optimal tari ff may well call for discrimination in favor of skilled immigrants and against similarly skilled natives, we might view an offe r of citizenship after a short waiting period as an efficient supplement or alternative to a negative tariff That is, the option value of citizenship for the skilled immigrant, whether psychic or economic, would probably equal or exceed any economic cost to natives from making this offer. There fore, an offer of U.S. citizenship for skilled immigrants after a short waiting period would be an efficient means for improving our offer of employment in the United States.
I. Fa mily-Based Immigration as a Negative Tariff
Similarly, immigration laws that allow skilled immigrants to petition for the immigration of their relatives might be viewed as an efficient substitute for an explicit negative tari ff That is, the right to sponsor relatives for immigration visas on more favorable terms than they could otherwise obtain may well stimulate skilled immigration at lower cost to natives than a fo rmal negative tariff designed to be equally attractive. For example, fo r fa mily-based immigrants, we might dispense with the requirement of employer sponsorship appl ied to employment-based immigrants. In fa ct, U.S. immigration laws require employer sponsorship only fo r employment-based visas: fa mily-based immigration does not require a petition from a prospective employer. The prospect of family reunification may lead skilled aliens to come the United States who would not otherwise.
As an additional benefit fo r the immigrant family, we might also offe r these family-based immigrants permanent residence and access to citizenship, which would imply nondiscriminatory taxes and access to public entitlements, even if we might otherwise admit aliens with similar skills only on nonimmigrant visas and impose a positive tariff on them. Before Congress enacted new restrictions on immigrant access to public entitlements in 1996, the United States generally provided such access to family-based immigrants even before naturalization: as legal permanent resident aliens, they enj oyed fo rmal access to most of the public entitlements provided to citizens. While the new restrictions drastically curtail immigrant access to public benefits, U.S. law continues to provide permanent resident aliens greater access to public benefits than that enj oyed by nonimmigrant al iens. Furthermore, as permanent residents, family-based immigrants are eligible to naturalize as U.S. citizens, and once naturalized, enjoy the same fiscal policies applied to U. S. natives. This equal treatment, even fo r less skilled immigrants, may be in the economic interest of natives insofar as skilled aliens contemplating immigration to the United States take into account the benefits their relatives will enjoy as fa mily-based immigrants.
In this sense, family-based immigration may act as an implicit negative tariff. ·Like an explicit negative tariff, family-based immigration may reduce the external benefits associated with each individual skilled immigrant, but as long as the family as a whole does not impose a net cost, family-based immigration may stimulate enough skilled immigration to be in the economic interest of natives. Furthermore, the presence of a sponsoring relative in the United States improves the likelihood that the sponsored relatives will integrate smoothly into the U.S. economy and will thus yield external benefits fo r natives rather than costs.
Thus, an offe r of family-based immigration may be an efficient means to improve our employment offer to skilled immigrants while maintaining a nondiscriminatory tax system.
We have already seen that it may be efficient to allow even the least skilled immigrant to bring a spouse and dependent children. The efficient policy may vary with the wealth of the immigrant, insofar as a wealthier immigrant may be willing to pay more fo r the immigration of a given relative . In this case, the economic value of a relative's immigration may be more likely to exceed the external costs that the relative would impose on natives. Given that skilled immigrants have higher levels of wealth than unskilled immigrants, their willingness to pay fo r the immigration of relatives may make it efficient to admit more distant relatives of skilled immigrants than of unskilled immigrants. If so, it may be optimal to allow skilled immigrants to sponsor a wider set of relatives than unskilled immigrants . In fact, under current U.S. law, immigrants may petition fo r the immigration of not only their spouses and children but ultimately also their parents, adult sons and daughters, and siblings.73 The United States does not grant temporary workers "permanent resident" status, however, and so they may not petition fo r the admission of the same classes of relatives (either as immigrants or nonimmigrants), but they may bring spouses and mmor children with them into the United States as nonimmigrants. 74 Although an immigrant may have access to some public benefits after admission to the United States (and fu ll access after naturalization), any alien deemed "likely at any time to become a 73 Permanent resident aliens may sponsor their spouses, children (under the age of 21 ), unmarried sons, and unmarried daughters fo r immigrant visas subject to quotas. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a)(2) ( 1994 ). Once an immigrant naturalizes as a U.S. citizen. then like other citizens, the immigrant may sponsor a spouse. children, and parents, who can obtain immigrant visas available fo r "immediate relati ves" without quantitative limits. See id § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). All U.S. citizens may also sponsor their '·unmarried sons or daughters,'' id § II 53( a)( I), "married sons or married daughters,'' id § 1153(a)(3), and '·brothers or sisters," id § 1153(a)(4), fo r immigrant visas, with each category subject to quotas.
See id § IIOI(a)( I5)(H).
public charge" may be excluded.75 In making this determination, consular offi cers consider the alien's age, health, education, skills, and assets. 76 Based on such evidence, consular officers have broad powers to screen out immigrants expected to have a negative effe ct on the public treasury. This inadmissibility ground serves to ensure that fa mily-based immigration as well as employment-based immigration is likely to have a net positive effect on the economic welfare of natives.
In fact, in the most careful and complete empirical analysis of the fiscal impact of immigration to date, the National Research Council fo und that even before Congress enacted new restrictions on immigrant access to public benefits in 1996, immigrants would have a net positive effect on the public treasury: that is, they and their descendants are likely to pay more in taxes than they will consume in public benefits. The Council estimates that the average immigrant will produce a net fiscal benefit of $80,000 overall in net present value in 1996 dollars.77 This surplus is striking because the Council's calculation includes all immigrants, including refugees and unauthorized immigrants,78 who are not subject to the "public charge" inadmissibility ground and have thus tended to be less educated and poorer than employment-based and family-based immigrants.79 75 !d. § 1182(a)( 4 ) ; see LEGOMSKY. supra note 50 . at 316 c-·over the years, the public charge provision has become the single most common affirmative substantive basis fo r denials of immigrant visas and one of the most common fo r non immigrants .... ·· (footnotes omitted)).
76 See 8 U.S.C. § l\82(a)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1996) . 77 See NRC, supra note 19. at 334 (Table 7 .5). 78 See id. at 306 ('"In principle, these surveys cover illegal immigrants as well as legal immigrants .... In our analysis we cannot distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants."). Furthermore, the Council estimates that the 1996 welfare legislation would improve the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant by $ 8,000 by excluding immigrants from various means-tested benefits.80 Thus, if the new welfare law has the effects predicted by its proponents, then the positive net fiscal impact of immigration will increase: the new restrictions would not only reduce the transfers paid to individual immigrants but also discourage the immigration of low income aliens.
To avoid the "public charge" inadmissibility ground, sponsoring relatives have often provided affidavits of support and evidence of their own incomes in order to gain the admission of the sponsored alien.81 Thus, when the sponsored alien has had a low income, then the income of the sponsor would become relevant: this inadmissibility ground has in effect limited the right to sponsor low-income relatives to those petitioners with adequate levels of income. In short, the "public charge" provision has served to ensure not only that family based immigrants impose little burden on the public sector but also that the fo rmal right to petition fo r low-income fam ily members is likely to prove valuable in effect only fo r immigrants with relatively high incomes. Consequently, the availability of these family-based visas serves as an incentive fo r skilled aliens in particular to choose to accept employment and residence in the United States.
In 1996, Congress imposed still more stringent requirements fo r family sponsorship that will fu rther limit access to these visas and will tend to reserve them fo r sponsors with relatively high incomes. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 requires virtually all family-based immigrants to submit an affidavit of support.82 An affidavit of support must now be a contract enforceable against the sponsor not only by the sponsored alien but also by a fe deral, state, or local agency seeking reimbursement fo r benefits 80 See NRC, supra note 19, at 339. provided to the sponsored alien under a means-tested entitlement program .83 The affi davit must bind the sponsor "to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line. "84 The sponsor must demonstrate "the means to maintain" at least this level of income fo r "a family unit of a size equal to the number of members of the sponsor's household (including fam ily and non-family dependents) plus the total number of other dependents and aliens sponsored by that sponsor. "85 These requirements will not only improve still fu rther the effe ct of family-based immigrants on public coffe rs but also deter or preclude those of modest means fr om sponsoring relatives fo r immigration.86 These requirements also ensure that the availability of family-based immigration visas will prove most valuable fo r the immigrants with the most wealth, because the number of relatives an immigrant can sponsor will be directly related to the immigrant's wealth. Furthermore, the legally binding obligations entailed by sponsorship will ensure that immigrants will sponsor only those relatives with II 1996) ). Thus, "deeming·· will render otherwise eligible immigrants ineligible fo r public benefits. is doubtful that many non-relatives wou ld agree to a request to be a co-sponsor, given the potential liability that co-sponsors would be assuming .
.. ). whom they have close ties. Immigrants will choose to sponsor only when they consider fam ily reunification very valuable and only when the welfare of the sponsored relative matters a great deal to the sponsor. Thus, legal liability will restrict sponsorship of indigent immigrants to those cases in which fam ily-based immigration will provide the most valuable incentive fo r the sponsor to immigrate.
Although restrictionists have proposed drastic cuts in family-based immigration, citing the national interest,87 these cuts may in fa ct reduce the economic welfare of natives by reducing the incentives fo r skilled immigration and by excluding valuable workers and taxpayers. Indeed, given the alternative of qualitative restrictions like the "public charge" inadmissibility ground as a device fo r regulating immigration, it is doubtful that quantitative restnct10ns on family-based immigration serve a useful purpose at all in the pursuit of national economic welfare. Liberalization or elimination of these quotas would probably serve the national economic interest better than cuts in these quotas.
Liberalized quotas would serve the interests of natives not only by increasing the immigration of valuable workers and taxpayers but also by allowing individual immigrants to enter sooner and thereby increasing the total economic contribution made by each immigrant. Quotas currently create backlogs of millions of family-based immigrants waiting fo r as long as ten years or more to enter the United States.88 The National Research Council fo und that immigrants arr1vmg at earlier ages make a significantly larger net fiscal contribution overall because they will spend more of their working 87 The Jordan Commission. fo r example. recommended the complete elimination of most fa mily-based ad mission categories. including not only siblings of U.S. citizens but also adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and of legal permanent residents. See JORDAN COMM'N, supra note I 0. at 70-7 1. The Smith and Simpson bills sought to implement these recommendations. See H.R. 2202, supra note 15; S. 1394, supra note 15.
88
For example, as of January 1997, 1.5 million siblings of U.S. citizens were on the waiting list fo r immigrant visas, and those currently eligible to enter applied at least I 0 years ago. See CIR, supra note 17, at 66. Sib! ing immigrants fr om oversubscribed countries had to wait even longer: those admitted fr om the Philippines, fo r example, applied nearly 20 years ago. See id.
lives--and thus pay more taxes--in the United States.89 Perversely, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform has cited the backlogs fo r fa mily-based immigrant visas as a reason to eliminate most categories of family-based immigration rather than as a reason to eliminate or liberalize the quotas.90 Liberalized quotas would reduce these backlogs, improve the fiscal impact of the average family-based immigrant, and would be more likely to promote the economic welfare of natives than the Commission's proposals. The Commission's restrictionist proposals seem particularly misguided, given the important changes in 1996 in the requirements fo r family sponsorship and in immigrant access to public benefits. Both sets of changes are likely to improve the fiscal effects of the average fa mily-based immigrant.91
Indeed, the new income test fo r family sponsorship sweeps so broadly that it applies to the sponsor regardless of the characteristics of the sponsored immigrant. Thus, the test seems over-broad and unduly rigid in that it will preclude the immigration of valuable workers and taxpayers simply because their sponsors have insufficient income. A test that would serve the interests of natives better would exempt sponsors fr om this test if the sponsored immigrant is likely to have a net positive effect on the public sector. For example, the National Research Council fo und that once we take account of the fi scal impact of an immigrant's descendants, the average immigrant with at least a high-school education wi ll have a positive fiscal effect.92 Simi larly, the Council also fo und that the average immigrant who arrives at age 40 or younger will have a positive fiscal effect.93 A 89 See NRC, supra note 19, at 328-35: see also ClR, supra note 17, at 66 (noting the '·extended waiting periods" fo r immigrant visas fo r siblings of U.S. citizens, which ··mean that most siblings enter well into their working lives, limiting the time during which they can make a contribution to the U.S. economy").
90 See ClR, supra note 17, at 66 (citing "the extraordinarily large waiting list fo r siblings of U.S. citizens, and to a lesser extent, adult children" and concluding that ·•[a]n end to extended
[family] visa categories is justified'').
91
By disqualifYing many sponsors . the changes in sponsorship rules are likely both to reduce fa mily-based visa backlogs and to create "a relatively wealthier mix" of fa mily-based immigrants. Wheel er, supra note 85, at 1591.
92 See NRC, supra note 19, at 334 (Table 7 .5).
liberalized rule that admitted young or educated immigrants regardless of the incomes of their sponsors would be more closely tailored to the national interest.
III. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AMONG NATIVES
The policies described above would maximize the total economic benefits fo r natives from immigration. While I have addressed how to maximize the total wealth of natives, I have not addressed the distribution of that wealth among natives. Immigration not only expands wealth, but also can have important distributive effects. Those natives who must compete with immigrants in the labor market may find that immigration reduces their real income.
Empirical studies, however, consistently find that immigration has only a weak effe ct on native wages.94 This result may not be surprising, given that natives and immigrants tend to work in diffe rent occupations and therefore tend not to compete in the same labor markets.95 Thus, immigration does have a more significant effe ct on the wages of earlier waves of immigrant workers, who are close substitutes fo r new immigrants.96
94 See id at 223 (surveying the empirical studies and observing a ··numerically weak relationship between native wages and immigration ... across all types of native workers. white and black. skilled and unskilled, male and fe male"); Bo�jas. Ec onomics of Immigration. supra note 33, at 1697 (same): Friedberg & Hunt, supra note 54. at 42 (""Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on the wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population. the literature on this question does not provide much support fo r this conclusion ''). 95 See NRC. supra note 19, at 218 (observing that immigrants arc concentrated in occupations '"at both the high and the low end of the educational distribution" and concluding that '"the data suggest that the jobs of immigrant and native workers are different").
96 See id at 223 ("'The one group that appears to suffe r signiticant negative effects from new immigrants are earl ier waves of immigrants, according to many studies."). Borjas claims:
··Ironically, even though the debate over immigration policy views the possibility that immigrants lower the wage of native workers as a harmful consequence of immigration, the economic benefits fr om immigration arise only when immigrants do lower the wage of native workers .
.. Borjas. Economic Benefits from Immigration, supra note 23, at 10-1 1. This claim, however, refers only to the immigration surplus enjoyed by natives through the private sector in labor markets with native workers. If only immigrant workers take certain jobs, then
On the other hand, even if present levels of immigration have little effect on native wages in the United States, a more liberal immigration policy could produce more significant effects.97 Thus, much of the support fo r immigration restriction is protectionist in nature: restrictionists often cite the need to protect U.S. workers from fo reign competition. The requirement of labor certification, in particular, is designed to ensure that immigrants do not "take jobs away" from U.S. workers or drive down their wages.
If we wish to protect workers fr om these distributive effects, however, the appropriate response is not protectionism but redistribution. Optimal policies would liberalize immigration insofar as it increases the total wealth of natives. As long as immigration increases total wealth, then those who gain from immigration can compensate those who lose and still be better off That is, those who gain by paying lower wages, or by buying products and services at lower cost, can affo rd to pay enough to compensate those who find their wages fall relative to prices. Redistributive policies can shift the costs of liberalized immigration to the beneficiaries of liberalization.
This redistribution would produce some costly distortions, but the deadweight loss of protectionism would be greater than the deadweight loss from redistributive taxes. That is, protectionism is less efficient than the tax system in producing a desirable distribution of income.98 For example, if the immigration of guestworkers reduces the wages of unskilled workers, then raising taxes on those with higher natives can gain from immigration in these markets without driving down the wages of any native workers. See NRC, supra note 19. at 220 ('"[T]he economic benefits of imm igration that operate only through lower prices. without displacing or disadvantaging competitive domestic labor. add to the positive effects of immigration.''). Furthermore, if immigrants generate a benefit fo r the public sector in the fo rm of tax revenues, then natives can gain fro m immigration even if there is no effe ct on wages at all.
97 See NRC, supra note 19, at 220 (explaining that the wage effects of immigration are small in part because '·the aggregate increase in the supply of labor caused by immigration is itself smal l"). 98 We can al ways replace an economically inefficient rule with an efficient rule without making any income class worse off, provided that we make the appropriate adjustments in incomes and reducing taxes on those with the lowest can leave all classes of natives better off than they would be in the absence of immigration.99 We can achieve this redistribution by expanding programs already in use under the existing U.S. income tax system: we could increase the earned income tax credit and liberalize its eligibility requirements, fo r example, to supplement the income of the working poor if liberalized immigration drives down their real wages. We can thereby reduce deadweight loss while still redistributing the same wealth that we currently redistribute through costly protectionism.
IV.
IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM Current immigration restrictions bear little resemblance to those that would maximize national economic welfare. The pursuit of this objective would probably entail levels of employment-based and family-based immigration higher than allowed by current laws. Given that the promotion of the interests of natives alone may seem offensive, however, because we do not truly believe that the welfare of immigrants should count fo r nothing, what normative implications can we draw fr om the preceding analysis fo r the reform of existing immigration laws? There are some liberalizing reforms that appear likely to improve matters compared to our current immigration laws, whether our measure of social welfare includes the interests of natives alone or includes the interests of immigrants as well. Liberalizing reforms that serve the interests of not only immigrants but also U.S. natives may stand the best chance of adoption, especially if we pursue such reforms in modest increments. Thus, I present these proposals not as ideal reforms but as the liberalizing reforms that seem most likely to prove political ly fe asible.
First, we should liberalize or eliminate our quotas on skilled immigrants and eliminate the "labor certification" requirements which impose protectionist restrictions on their immigration. We should also liberalize our quotas on family-based immigration, subject to the "public charge" inadmissibility ground, which provides an efficient incentive fo r skilled immigration while protecting public coffe rs. Furthermore, we should liberalize requirements fo r sponsorship of family-based immigrants so that young and educated immigrants are not excluded based solely on the income of their sponsors. Skilled immigration is in the interests of U.S. natives as well as of the immigrants.
Second, we should liberalize our existing guestworker programs so as to allow more unskilled aliens to work in the United States. We should eliminate "labor certification" requirements fo r guestworkers, which raise protectionist barriers to their employment. We should also liberalize our quotas on these admissions, our restrictions on the duration of their employment, and our limits on the length of their stay in the United States as workers. A liberalized guestworker program would be in the economic interest of natives as well as in the interest of the guestworkers. One question regarding national economic welfare arises with respect to the costs unskilled immigrants might impose through the public sector. To the extent this cost is a concern, the appropriate response would be fi scal: discriminatory fiscal policies can ensure that guestworkers impose no net external costs. Even with such discriminatory fe atures, a liberalized guestworker program would be an improvement fo r the many aliens excluded by existing laws. Unskilled guestworkers also raise an issue with respect to the distribution of income among natives, but again the appropriate response is fiscal: to compensate unskilled native workers fo r any reduction in their real wages, Congress could combine immigration reforms with tax relief fo r the working poor, such as expansions in the earned income tax credit.
Why has the United States not moved toward such policies? Part of the problem may be the xenophobia and intolerance that have unfortunately always exerted a powerful influence on the fo rmulation of immigration policies. Part of the explanation may be the same protectionist pressures generated by special interest groups that oppose liberalized trade in goods: those who fe ar fo reign competition lobby fo r protectionist barriers. Unskilled native workers, fo r example, may oppose the immigration of guestworkers. To the extent Congress links a liberalized guestworker program with subsidies fo r the working poor, however, progressive tax refom1s designed to compensate unskilled labor could help overcome opposition to liberal ization .
The United States might also employ the same device used in the international trade context to overcome the protectionist opposition to liberalizing reforms: multilateral agreements in which each country agrees to reduce trade barriers in exchange fo r liberalization by others. The prospect of reciprocal liberalization by our trading partners mobilizes domestic producer interests in support of the agreement that can offs et the domestic producer interests opposed to liberalization of our policies. Through such agreements, each country can gain not only by obtaining access to fo reign markets but also by overcoming protectionism at home and opening its own market.
So far, the United States has applied a double standard to the liberalization of trade in services:
Although at the level of general principle the United States In the initial negotiations over the GATS, the United States failed in its efforts to obtain a "hard" agreement along GATT lines, with generally binding obligations, including a "national treatment" obligation, which would prohibit discrimination against fo reign suppliers of services.
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To promote more comprehensive liberalization in the future, the United States could agree to place its own immigration policies regarding temporary workers on the negotiating table under the 100 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 2, at 226.
101
See Hoekman, supra note 2, at 925. auspices of the GATS.102 In exchange fo r commitments by the United States regarding temporary workers, labor-abundant developing countries may be more inclined to agree to liberalize their markets fo r services in which the United States has a comparative advantage.
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The United States would gain not only by reforming its own immigration laws, but also by obtaining commitments by developing countries that they have been reluctant to make thus far (such as a "national treatment" obligation fo r services).
Negotiations would provide a justification fo r our failure to adopt more liberal immigration laws. Whereas in an ideal world we might adopt more efficient laws, we currently live in a highly nonideal world in which other governments discriminate against our nationals (in their goods markets, service markets, labor markets, or capital markets). Given this reality, we may use costly policies as bargaining chips, offering to reform our protectionist policies in exchange fo r liberalizing reforms by other governments that discriminate against our nationals. Reforms implemented through a multilateral agreement 102 See GATS Annex. supra note 9. para. 3. 33 I.L.M. at 1188 ( .. Members may negotiate specific commitments applying to the movement of all categories of natural persons supplying services under the Agreement. .. ); Sauve, supra note 2, at 134 ("'The Annex ... establishes that Members may negotiate specific commitments applying to the temporary entry of all categories of natural persons'').
The development of this Annex was--and remains--of particular interest to developing countries, given the comparative advantage many of them enjoy in labour-intensive services (e.g. construction services, software development, engineering design). Recognition of the fact that most developed countries had not included categories of greatest interest to developing-country exporters led to the adoption of a Ministerial Decision calling for negotiations to continue beyond the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and aimed at achieving higher levels of commitments by GATS Members.
Sauve. supra note 2. at 135.
The government of a country sending workers to the United States would perceive a benefit from liberalized guestworker policies as long as it remains concerned about the wei fa re of these workers. Furthermore, even if that government no longer regarded such workers as its constituents, the tendency of migrant workers to send remittances back home to help support fr iends and fam ily left behind would represent an important benefit fo r the country of emigration. For example, a recent study estimated that Mexican migrants in the United States send between $2.5 billion and $3.9 billion per year back home to Mexico, the equivalent of about half the direct fo reign investment in Mexico. See Sam Dillon . US Mex ico Study Sees Exaggeration of Migration Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997. § I. at I, 6.
